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1Impact has now also been embedded as a 
device for measuring value in UK’s funding 
Research Councils (RCUK) in the Research 
Exercise Framework (REF). Although this is 
not key to arguments on art and its instru-
mentalization, it points to the ways in which 
economic and ideological priorities have 
gripped all areas of knowledge production 
within what I describe as the ‘instrumental 
turn’. 
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ABSTRACT This text considers UK 
‘third way’ cultural policy and its agenda of 
impact that seeks to directly connect with 
processes of social and economic change 
via the commissioning of art and culture. I 
claim that publicly funded art commissioned 
as part of ‘impact policy’ is increasingly 
instrumentalized and that this process has 
become complicit with and functional for an 
agenda of privatization and marketization. 
I propose that third way cultural policy 
produces debased public spheres. In order 
to understand how this occurs and in 
what ways the state utilizes art practice, 
I present three forms of rhetoric common 
to third way cultural policy and public art 
commissioning. This articulation allows 
us to comprehend how cultural policy is 
a steering medium that promotes ideas 
of economics and ways of living that are 
increasingly informed by neoliberal values 
and that further undermine public interest, 
social justice, and democratic debate. 
1 HEWITT
ART, ITS PUBLICS AND AN AGENDA OF IMPACT: 
THE UK CASE
Andrew Hewitt
In the UK the impact agenda for the publically funded arts has 
advanced despite a lack of evidence to back claims for its instru-
mentalization.1 Three forms of rhetoric are commonly used in third 
way policy and interrogate this agenda for art’s function using public 
sphere theory as a critical framework.2 Habermas’ theories of publics 
and of the public sphere are concerned with communicatory interac-
tion, debate and opinion formation between social actors forming a 
deliberating citizenry that is central to operations of democracy.3 The 
rhetorics are, art as a form of cultural democracy; art as an economic 
driver; and art as a provider of (solutions for) social amelioration. 
What these rhetorics reveal is that cultural policy can operate as 
a steering medium that promotes ideas of economics and ways of 
living that are increasingly informed by neoliberal values. This process 
further undermines public interest, social justice, and democratic 
debate (fig. 1). Third way cultural policy also undermines critical art 
production and produces ‘safe’ third way art.
IMPACT IN THIRD WAY GOVERNANCE
To understand the rise of culture for third way politics — and hence my critique of its 
accompanying rhetorical functions — it is first worth retracing recent policy develop-
ments.4 Social theorist and Labour advisor Anthony Giddens, who 
together with Tony Blair was the architect of ‘New’ Labour, proposed 
third way political governance. The new social democratic politics 
that they claimed were a response to the dilemmas facing Western 
post-industrial society, and more pragmatically a politics that would 
bring Labour to power.5 Third way politics was influenced by neolib-
eralism but adapted to the UK context of welfare state reforms. For 
New Labour, the third way was an ideological leap to the right, under-
mining the ‘left’s core social and political values, i.e. the traditional 
Labour Party goal of social justice via intervention by the state. In 
third way political theory, social justice is replaced by ideas of social 
inclusion.6 The concept of third way citizenship then becomes framed 
in terms of the ‘individual’ in society and how effectively one partici-
pates in the economic system. As a result, measurement of the impact 
was required for state policy. 
In post-Fordist Britain, culture and the ‘cultural industries’ were 
imagined as providing a means to economically regenerate the nation 
via the signs and symbols of ‘cultural capitalism’.7 In 1997, New 
Labour set in motion a new phase of instrumental policy for art and 
culture, described by Murdock as a “shift in public policy”, to market-
ization, privatization, and liberalization.8 As Griffiths pointed out: “[i]
n the UK the cultural sphere has been gaining a more central role in 
public policy over the last 10-15 years”.9 Prime Minister Blair stated 
in populist terms that culture was to be available to ‘the many not 
the few’, with the first Culture Secretary Chris Smith establishing the 
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Department of Culture, Media and Sport to promote the interests and market potential 
of the ‘creative industries’ — a wide field of artistic, cultural, and technological practices 
employing an instrumentalized conception of art.10
The agenda for arts policy then was to ‘converge’ with third way economic and 
social policy initiatives in order to impact upon serious levels of deprivation within 
post-industrial cities. Known as ‘culture-led regeneration’, cultural planning then posi-
tioned culture and creativity as a means to achieve social inclusion 
and to promote ideas of citizenship and social reconstruction. It was, 
however, also tied to economic and social development objectives. In 
this context, art was subsidized to new and higher levels, but at a cost: 
it was further instrumentalized as an agent of political, social, and 
cultural complicity.11
Having set out the context for the convergence of cultural policy 
and wider governance, below I will introduce the three key rhetorics 
that have emerged in cultural policy that envisage forms of function-
ality for art production and become a measure of its impact. 
1. Art as a form of cultural democracy
In the rhetoric of art as a cultural democracy, the art gallery is 
imagined as a public space where debates on contemporary social 
matters as a form of participation in ‘cultural citizenship’ are thought 
to contribute to empowering citizens and the revitalization of 
civil society. Many new art galleries built under New Labour were 
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perceived as the new agoras, where citizens could enjoy interaction, experience socia-
bility, and thereby produce forms of social cohesion through cultural participation.12 In 
addition, the commissioning of artworks by increasingly diverse public, private, and third 
sector organizations saw artists deployed to work on social agenda projects to address 
social problems and to come into contact with new audiences.
2. Art as a driver for economic development
The articulation of art as an economic driver encourages the use of art within urban 
regeneration, in visual ‘place-making’ and in art biennials, thereby contributing to the 
re-branding of post-industrial cities for inward investment and as tourist destinations. 
Artists participated in urban planning as art experts on design committees and recip-
ients of commissions from arts development companies to produce spectacular visual 
works for urban centres.13 Artists were also valued and marketed as a visibly conspic-
uous ‘cool’ social group that regenerated the places they lived and worked in.14
3. Art as a provider of social amelioration 
Finally, the expression of art as a form of social amelioration sets out to provide 
increased access for ‘economically challenged’ citizens, to partic-
ipate in art and culture and thus, according to the rhetoric, to be 
inspired and therefore aspire to better and more cultured lives.15 
Artists are recruited into informal education and outreach workshop 
programmes,16 a process that according to Charles Landry can change 
the ‘mindset’ and ‘behavior’ of residents, “to improve their effectiveness 
in creating capital and growth in order to reduce what is seen as a 
dependency on state provision”.17 This is a concise articulation of art 
production and its functions within and for policy but it shows at once 
the range of ways art is perceived as functioning for the state. 
 
ART AS A PUBLIC GOOD
What is manifest in third way cultural policy is the idea of liberal art 
and culture having universal benefits and important functions within 
a modern society as a ‘public good’. In cultural policy, ‘impact’ is then 
a new term for a continuing debate. Arguments on art’s instrumen-
talization and ideas of art as a public good have been rumbling on in 
the UK since the formation of the Arts Council of Great Britain back in 
1946, when the state formally took over as patron of the arts.18 Back 
then, the Labour Party had the thorny problem of directly engaging 
what was deemed to be high art, minority, or dominant culture, with 
processes of social change for the majority; addressed, largely, by 
providing the lower classes with increased ‘access’ to middle-class 
culture, its taste, and aspirations. 
This is an ideological understanding of art as a public good. 
For example, John Holden described the potential of art to “release 
the talents and increase the capital of the whole of society”.19 ‘Public 
good’ is connected to governance and political decision-making, with 
the state producing what it sees as public values or public interest 
in policy for collective, ethical notions of the ‘good’, usually to coun-
terbalance public and private interests between the state, citizens, 
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and business. Therefore, what constitutes a public good (or its potential impact) is an 
ideological question; public good might be beneficial to one social group but detrimental 
to another. 
With publically funded arts and culture chiefly characterized as a benign force 
for the common good, art production becomes a means to reach and influence people, 
coupled to a distinctively neoliberal conception of public good, namely privatization and 
marketization. What this policy ignores is art’s own politics and its contested function in 
society, i.e. the social and cultural divisions that form art and sustain it.
AUDIENCES VERSUS PUBLICS
There is no doubt that art is attractive to policymakers who have been quick to seize on 
art for a third way agenda. Art is useful because it produces audiences, it communicates 
and disseminates ideas, and it has the reputation of being special, clever, and valuable. 
In evaluation processes for agencies such as the Arts Council England, the small chatty 
cultural audiences that art produces are referred to as actively engaged participatory 
publics of the political kind. Art’s audience is also portrayed as an imaginary ‘general 
public’ or a cohesive singular version of the public. However, we can identify theories 
that deal with the concept of ‘the public’ starting from Habermas’ public sphere and the 
critiques of his theories that followed (for example by Nancy Fraser). Habermas’ theories 
of publics and of the public sphere are concerned with communicatory interaction, 
debate, and opinion formation between social actors forming a deliberating citizenry that 
is central to operations of democracy.20 As Habermas describes, “the public sphere can 
best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e. 
opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, 
in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of 
topically specified public opinions”.21 Thus, public sphere discourse problematizes the 
mechanisms for collective decision-making. It allows us to understand publics engaged 
in producing opinion and debate and their relationship to and effect on the institutional 
apparatus of the democratic state.
Habermas’ early conception or blueprint of the bourgeois public sphere was a 
historical account of the formation of these processes in eighteenth-century Europe and 
has been criticized for its limitations. Critics suggest that his public sphere, far from 
being a space of equals, engaged in a debate on matters of common interest, and was 
instead the foundation for an emergent class who were set to repress weaker plebian 
public spheres. Later theories, such as those of Oskar Negt and Alexandar Kluge, Nancy 
Fraser, and Michael Warner, provide ideas of counter-publics, comprised of excluded 
marginal groups, seeking social justice, making demands based on cultural or political 
alterity, be it class, gender, race or sexuality. Counter-publics transform the public sphere 
from a place of talk to one of unrest, violence, and social change. This multiplication 
of public spheres suggests that there are official and powerful public spheres and a 
host of rival counter-publics in existence. In this context, ‘the public’ can be regarded 
as a misnomer for a citizenry that is diverse, contradictory, fractured, and that includes 
dominant publics, but also subaltern and counter-publics. We can, 
therefore, conclude that there is not a singular art public, only groups 
of common interest that are small, divided, and contested. 
In the Habermasian conception, the public sphere is public not 
because of its spaces but because of its activities. The emphasis is 
on publishing and making one’s ideas public through argument and 
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debate. He calls for a multiplicity of public spheres that include the marginal, subordi-
nate and oppositional, what Habermas called the ‘periphery’, who challenge the interests 
of ruling elites and liberal reticence. Its potential is in the transformation of individual 
citizens into public publics. 
In the rhetoric of ‘art as a form of cultural democracy’ with the building of new 
art galleries as new agoras, the art gallery largely operates to produce visual works for 
aesthetic contemplative thought — not debate and political argumentation. ‘Audience 
development’ for art tends toward the affirmative processes of educating and cultur-
alizing visitors and is a space for convivial exchange. While these activities are not 
without value, cultural institutions do risk becoming safe, uncritical, and conservative 
when hitched to a third way function of producing social cohesion. The gallery is a 
space for cultural public spheres — not political public spheres — and is in the main an 
unpromising place for citizens to have their say or to be active producers themselves. 
The increase of art commissioning by non-art organizations may offer exciting 
interdisciplinary activity, however, work is set on the host’s terms (often third way 
prerogatives) which, whilst providing stimulating paid work for artists, leads to artworks 
that function as publicity and illustrative production for the commissioner. Agora for 
social inclusion can only provide debased public spheres with art production that looks 
to construct civic identities.  
In the rhetoric of ‘art as an economic driver’, the process of art commissioning 
is a part of the styling of the city with works selected for visual effect as formal and 
decorative, in line with the branding of urban spaces. In this process of marketization, 
artists’ work becomes tied to developer-led real estate speculation and capital accu-
mulation that, in situations were planning regulations are weak or debased, produces 
economic asymmetries in which low incomes residents make way for gated communities 
in a process of gentrification.22 Planning processes are notoriously opaque for residents 
and communities to engage in and so having representation by art experts on design 
committees can further obfuscate negotiation for sustainable and equitable solutions 
with art’s values, codes, and cultural capital becoming a means to legitimize controver-
sial developments. In addition, cultural workers are also active in shaping the city for the 
benefit of their own elite cultural class, which is not a universal benefit and can function 
to maintain both cultural and social divisions.
Finally, in terms of ‘art providing solutions for social amelioration’, middle-class 
culture cannot be a means to bring about social justice. ‘Access’ to culture is widened 
to a culture predetermined in the image of the governing cultural body. Arts’ publics 
are thereby rendered passive receivers of culture rather than being empowered to 
shape cultures. The use of agencies such as publicly funded arts institutions repeat this 
management process and, in the case of the arts, act as a means to promote community 
relations. Cultural workers are then deployed in lower class neighborhoods to help locals 
become ‘full’ economic citizens by gaining employment and raising aspirations. Cultural 
education programmes are used to supplement social inclusion policy as a means to 
manage people and their behaviour. This model of using culture for social intervention is 
patriarchal and reformist in character and does not tackle systemic social inequalities. 
IMPACT POLICY AND DEBASED PUBLIC SPHERE
The impact agenda engenders a social function for art in constructing 
civic identities. The field of publicly funded art then functions to 
legitimize initiatives and policy aims, but does not ask what should or 
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should not be done in the future, thereby funneling people by managing public opinion 
as a form of steering media. Habermas also provides the concept of ‘steering media’, 
that is the inherent directing and coordinating mechanisms of state administration and 
the economy that are in the hands of experts and administrators and operate away 
from public scrutiny and possible democratic control.23 Such policy functions to produce 
opinion-formation for the state, and in doing so supports bureaucratic, managerial, and 
social control mechanisms that cannot be deemed as a public good. The rhetoric of 
third way cultural policy is, therefore, a debasement of the public sphere (of democratic 
communication between the state and citizens), and in this process art functions to 
produce an impression of positive social change while state policy is actually driving 
further privatization of the state sector, diminishing the transparency of governance, and 
producing further social division. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the impact agenda of ‘third way’ cultural policy that utilizes publically 
funded art and culture to directly engage with processes of social change is flawed. 
As I have described, the three rhetoric of arts policy as a public good function instead 
as steering media for the state. It is my contention that uncritical and affirmative 
cultural production has the effect of producing debased publics spheres that undermine 
democracy. 
Despite the rhetoric from arts advocates, top-down state-run art institutions are 
unpromising arenas for open, public debate providing a weak platform for political 
public spheres. In addition, art under ‘third way’ governance has economic functions, 
for example in urban planning in which art and artists plays a role in place making. 
However, in the dynamics of property-led urban development with weak social housing 
policy and processes of gentrification, the benefits reach elite social groups, the tradi-
tional users of high culture, therefore, preserving both cultural and social division. 
Thirdly, the idea of ‘access’ to art as a force for change in society offers a very limited 
scope to alter socio-economic divisions. Instead, the social inclusion policy as a form 
of social amelioration is reformist, to provide social cohesion via cultural education 
programmes as a means to manage people and their behaviour.
Art can produce debate, discussion, and sometimes controversy, but the commu-
nicative potential of a ‘third way art’ is limited and undoes the transformative and 
critical potential of art. Third way cultural public spheres that use techniques of partic-
ipation and display function independently from politics and actually work towards the 
diminishment of transparent governance, which in turn exacerbates social division. 
It becomes crucial to defend and re-articulate key concepts in progressive politics, 
such as public interest, social justice, and democratic debate, and to demand the effec-
tive translation of these ideas, through the activity of state institutions, for example, from 
those that produce visual culture. Say no to third way impact policy 
and say no to third way art.
